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I. PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. Appellant Carol Capato
was the plaintiff. Appellees Garff Enterprise, Inc., Ken Garff, Tena Holbrook, and
Does I-X were the defendants.
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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
V. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue
Whether the trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of
material fact that plaintiff purchased the vehicle "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing
Owed/Nothing Promised" and that, in any event, the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale itself
completely precludes all of Capato's causes of action. Minute Entry, R. 134-36; A. 7-9;
Order and Judgment, R. 143-44; A. 11-12.
Standard of Review
The Appellate Court reviews the trial court's conclusion of law that the Motor
Vehicle Contract of Sale itself, further supplemented by the "As Is - No Warranty"
disclaimer, and the "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimer, precludes all of
Capato's claims with no presumption of correctness. Smith v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 949 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) (citing Zions First National Bank v. National
American Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988)).

-1-

VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
On June 1, 1996, Carol Capato purchased from Tena Holbrook a used 1986

Mercedes 190E that had 126,850 miles on it. R. 63-65, 97-98, and 102; A. 1-2, and 6.
On July 3, 1996, Capato was traveling east on 1-80 towards Evanston, Wyoming in the
1986 Mercedes. R. 92. The air bag deployed causing Capato to lose control of the car.
Id. Capato allegedly suffered personal injuries and property damage in the accident.
R. 1-8.
The car was sold pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale that disclaimed all
warranties. R. 63-64 and 97-98; A. 1-2. Capato admitted and the trial court acknowledged that she signed this contract. R. 92. Further, the car was sold "As Is - No
Warranty" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." R. 61 and 99 -101; A. 3-5. Capato
signed these disclaimers as well. Id. However, she maintains she did not sign them.
R. 58-59 and 70-71. Upon Capato's request, the Garff defendants produced all the signed
documents for handwriting analysis. R. 58-69. There has been no evidence that her
signatures are not authentic. R. 92 and 129.
The defendants moved the trial court for summary judgment maintaining that the
Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale and/or the "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing
Owed/Nothing Promised" documents precluded Capato's suit. R. 88-89. Oral argument
was heard by the trial court on March 2, 1998. On March 16, 1998, the trial court,
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considering the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, the "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing
Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimers, and the absence of any specific oral representations
or advertising that allegedly induced Capato to buy the car, entered its Minute Entry granting the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. R. 134-37; A. 7-10.
B.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review, with Citation to
Record.
On June 1, 1996 Carol Capato purchased from Tena Holbrook a used 1986

Mercedes 190E that had 126,850 miles on it. R. 63-65, 97-98, and 102; A. 1-2, and 6.
On July 3, 1996, Capato was traveling east on 1-80 towards Evanston, Wyoming in the
1986 Mercedes. R. 92. The air bag deployed. Id. The odometer showed 129,266 miles.
Id. In other words, plaintiff drove the vehicle more than 2,400 miles after she purchased
it on June 1, 1996. R. 65, 92, and 102.
The Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale explicitly stated the ten-year-old Mercedes was
sold without any warranty, express or implied. R. 63-64 and 97-98; A. 1-2. Capato
signed this contract. Id. andR. 129; A.M. Also, the ten-year-old Mercedes was sold to
Capato "As Is - No Warranty" and with "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." R. 61, 99 101; A. 3-5. Capato signed both of these disclaimers. Id. Capato has presented no
evidence to the contrary despite requesting and receiving all signed documents for
handwriting analysis. R. 58-69 and 92.
The Mercedes was a consignment vehicle owned by Tena Holbrook, not Garff
Enterprises. R. 132; A. 17. Capato was told that the Mercedes was a consignment
-3-

vehicle. R. 132-33; A. 17-18. She was also told that it did not go through the extended
Garff inspection checklist. Id. She was also told she could buy a warranty, but she chose
not to do so. R. 129-31; A. 14-16.
The cause of the air bag's deployment has not been determined. Capato merely
asserts that it was caused by the drive-line flex-disk. R.3. Assuming the air bag did
deploy due to the failure of a part, the failure occurred after ten years and nearly 130,000
miles of driving. R. 92.
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Capato bought a ten-year-old car, with 126,853 miles on it, pursuant to a Motor
Vehicle Contract of Sale. R. 63-65, 97-98 and 102; A. 1-2 and 6. There is no genuine
issue of material fact as to the terms of the sale. The Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale "No
Warranty, Express or Implied" provision, the "As Is - No Warranty" form, and the
"Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" form terms are spelled out in big, black, bold, letters
on disclaimers bearing Capato's signature. R. 61, 63-64, 97-98, 99, and 101.; A. 1-5.
This car was bought without a warranty. In fact, Capato knew she could purchase a
warranty, but she chose not to do so. R. 129-31; A. 14-16. As a matter of law, under the
terms of sale, Capato bore the risk of buying a ten-year-old used car. She drove the car
more than 2,400 miles after the purchase. R. 65, 92, and 102; A. 6. A part failed, as
parts in older used cars are known to do. Although this is unfortunate, it is not a basis to
shift the risk to the defendants, especially in light of the clear terms of sale.
-4-

VIII. ARGUMENT
POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THE CORRECTNESS
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION BECAUSE CAPATO
HAS NOT PROPERLY PREPARED OR CITED TO THE
RECORD ON APPEAL.
Capato has failed to compile and properly cite to the Record on Appeal. Capato's
memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment is not in the
Record on Appeal. Under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is the
appellant's duty to insure that the record is complete and properly addresses the issues
raised on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. Rule 11; see also J&M Construction, Inc. v.
Southam, 722 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1986) ("It is the appellant's responsibility to
mar shall all the relevant evidence in the record to support its contentions on appeal.")
(citations omitted). The consequence for leaving the record incomplete is this Court's
presumption that the trial court's ruling was correct. State v. Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("In the absence of an adequate record on appeal, we cannot address
the issues raised and will presume the correctness of the disposition made by the trial
court) (citing State v. Cash, 727 P.2d 218 (Utah 1986) and Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d
998 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989)); see also Horton v. Gem
State Mut., 794 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (If the record before the appellate court
is incomplete, the court is unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence).
-5-

Despite the fact that her memorandum in opposition to defendants' summary
judgment is not in the record, Capato cites to it repeatedly in her brief. See Brief of
Appellant, pp. 2-5. Further, she attempts to circumvent the Record on Appeal and attach
her memorandum as an addendum to her brief. See Brief of Appellant, p. 3, 11. 1-5 and
Addendum, pp. 4-34. Unfortunately for Capato, under Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, she cannot cite to materials outside the Record on Appeal. Utah
appellate courts have "repeatedly noted that [they] will not accept as true factual
allegations in briefs not properly cited to the record." Butler Crockett & Walsh Dev.
Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225 (Utah 1995); see also Uckerman
v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("This Court need not,
and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record).
Further, "an appellant's failure to cite to the record in a brief is grounds for assuming
regularity in the proceedings and correctness in the judgment appealed from." Butler,
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., supra at 230 (citing State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 221
(Utah 1995) and State v. Olmos, 111 P. 2d 287, 287 (Utah 1986); see also Dirks v.
Cornwell, 754 P.2d 946, 947-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("We note initially that defendant's
brief on appeal fails to conform to Rule 24. We could therefore, sua sponte disregard
defendant's brief on appeal and assume the correctness of the judgment below."). In
Butler, Crockett & Walsh, the Utah Supreme Court comments:
The justification for this rather severe rule is that a "reviewing court is
entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not
-6-

simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research."
Id. at 230.
Simply attaching the omitted portions of the record as an addendum to the
appellant's brief is not sufficient to complete the record. Rule 24(a)(l 1) proscribes what
may be included in the addendum.1 Clearly, Rule 24(a) does not legitimize using the
addendum as the means by which the appellant can freely supplement the Record on
Appeal.

2

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(ll) reads:

(11) . . . The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A)

any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of
central importance cited in the brief but not reproduced
verbatim in the brief;

(B)

in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central
importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part
of a regularly published reporter service; and

(C)

those parts of the record on appeal that are of central
importance to determination the appeal, such as the challenged
instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or
the contract or document subject to construction.

(Emphasis added.)
-7-

It is not the appellee's nor this Court's responsibility to insure the Record on Appeal
is complete. See Butler, Crockett, & Walsh Dev. Corp., supra, and / &MManufacturing,
supra. As such, this Court is left with the presumption of the trial court's correctness.
POINT II

THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT
THAT THE CAR WAS SOLD WITHOUT A WARRANTY.
Summary judgment requires there be no genuine issues of material fact. Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c). There is no issue of material fact in this case. The terms of the sale were
clear. Defendants made no warranties.
A.

The Terms of the Sale Were Clear and Signed.
Capato attempts to raise an issue of fact surrounding the "No Warranty" and "As

Is" terms of the sale. This is a red herring. There is no genuine dispute as to the terms
of the sale. They were spelled out in big, black, bold letters on three documents bearing
Capato's signature. First, the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale reads:
As stated on the reverse side of this document, unless seller has given to
Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing, Seller makes no Warranty,
express or implied, with respect to the merchantability, fitness for particular
purpose, or otherwise concerning the vehicle, parts or accessories described
herein. Unless otherwise indicated in writing, any warranty is limited to that
provided by the manufacturer, if any, as explained and conditioned by
Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof.
R.63 and 97, A. 1. The reverse side of the contract reads in bold and capital letters:
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY THE
SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR
-8-

MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT
AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR SUCH
USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH
WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.
R.64and98,A.

2.

Second, the written warranty statement reads in oversized, bold, capital letters:
"AS IS - NO WARRANTY"
"YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer
assumes no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any oral
statement made about the vehicle.
R. 61-62 and 99-100; A. 3.
Third, the work promised statement reads in oversized, bold, capital letters:
"WE OWE YOU"
"Nothing owed/Nothing promised"
R. 101; A. 5.
There can be no dispute that she did not know the meaning of the words "As Is,"
"No Warranty," and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." These are not convoluted, fine
print representations of contractual sales terms. Beyond these disclaimers, defendants
made it painfully clear to Capato that this was a consignment vehicle sold "As Is" without
any warranty whatsoever. R. 129-33; A. 14-18. Capato specifically asked about purchasing a warranty for the vehicle. Id. She never purchased one. Id. Illustrating this,
Capato's deposition testimony was presented to the trial court as follows:

-9-

"During the time that you were looking into making the acquisition of the
'86 Mercedes, did you make any inquiry to Tina Holbrook (that was our
salesperson) as to whether there would be any warranty that attached?"
She says, "Yeah."
And I said, "When was that?"
And Mrs. Capato says:
"I asked if I could have an extended warranty."
I asked her: "Tell me when that was."
She said: "The same day I was acquiring it."
"OnJune'96?"
"Yes."
"You asked Tina?"
"Yes."
"For an extended warranty?"
"Yes."
And then we continue on over on Page 51:
"So you asked Tina if you could get an extended warranty. And what did
Tina tell you?"
"She would look into it."
"Was this the end of the conversation with Tina on that subject or was there
more?"
The answer: "That was basically, yes, because I was waiting to see if I
could get it."
-10-

And then I asked her: "So the last you heard on your request for an
extended warranty was, 'I will look into it?"'
Her answer: "I'm looking, yes."
Then I asked her: "Did you understand that the extended warranty was
something that would have to be purchased?"
Her answer was: "I didn't mind purchasing, you know, an extended
warranty. I wanted one."
And then I asked her: "You knew an extended warranty didn't come for
free?"
She said, "Actually, I didn't know a whole lot about it. I just knew it was
a good idea. I wanted to get one. Yes, I knew it didn't come for free."
"Any other discussions with Tina?"
She says, "Not that I can recall."
Then on Page 54 of her own deposition, she admits she knew the car was ten
years old, had over a hundred thousand miles on it.
Then on to Page 55, back to this subject about an extended warranty:
* * *

"— up until the 3rd of July, did you make any additional efforts toward
obtaining the extended warranty?"
"Yes."
I asked her to tell me what.
"I called there to ask for Tina, and they would say she was out or with
someone and I had to leave a message."
Then I go on: "Did you have any conversations with Tina?"

-11-

Down at the bottom she says:
"No, I never got to find out."
Basically, this is the Plaintiff: "I never got to find out about the extended
warranty."
At the top of Page 57: "Did you speak to anyone else at Ken Garff during
that time about the subject of your desire to acquire an extended warranty?"
Her answer was: "When I asked her or talking to her, this other man who
was writing up the papers, the finance guy, was there. I didn't really talk
to him about it."
And then I asked her a few more questions in the middle of Page 57:
"Did you talk to anybody?"
"Answer: No."
R. 130-31; A. 15-16 (quoting Deposition of Carol Capato pp. 49,51,54-57).
In support of her argument that the terms of the sale were unclear, Capato cites
Thomas v. Ruddle Lease - Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash. App. 1986). Unfortunately for Capato, Thomas is of no use to her. In Thomas, the car salesman told the used
car buyer that the "As Is" disclaimer was as only applicable in narrow circumstances
involving engine wear due to high performance driving. Id. at 913 and 915. The used car
developed problems beyond engine wear and the dealer tried to engage the disclaimer.
Therefore, the parties' understanding and representations of what "As Is" meant was a
factual issue. In contrast, there is no dispute as to what "As Is - No Warranty" meant and
applied to in Capato's case. The disclaimers were clear and understood by Capato and she
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has not presented any evidence that the defendants ever misrepresented the meaning and
breadth of the disclaimers. There is no jury question here. See Tibbetts v. Openshaw,
425 P.2d 160 (Utah 1967) (Upholding trial court's refusal to present jury instruction
regarding warranty terms when purchaser failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the "As Is" term of sale was misunderstood.)
Capato further attempts to raise a factual issue based on the "Nothing Owed/
Nothing Promised" disclaimer. R. 101. Capato attempts to cast this document as a
confusing representation of the vehicle's condition. See Brief of Appellant, p. 7. Capato
is mistaken. This disclaimer indicates that the sale to Capato was free and clear and that
no service was promised to Capato and no service was owed — nothing else. There is
nothing in this document that indicates the condition of the vehicle or that it was a "perfect
car." R. 132; A. 17. This disclaimer is as clear as it could possibly be. At the top it
reads in big, black, block letters: "WE OWE YOU." R. 101; A. 5. Under that it reads
in plain black print "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised." Id. At the bottom of this disclaimer is Capato's signature. Id.
Capato cites to Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) for the generic
principle that if the interpretation of a fact is disputed, summary judgment is not
appropriate. More accurately, an issue of fact must be "genuine" to preclude summary
judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also First American Title Insurance Co. v. J.B.
Ranch, Inc., 1998 WL 234063 (Utah May 12, 1998). While Capato may assert that these
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terms have meanings different from their plain and common usage, this dispute is not
"genuine." These terms are clear and easily understood. There is no room for confusion
or dispute here.
B.

Capato Signed the Disclaimers. Her Assertion That She Did Not Is a Red Herring.
Capato attempts to create an issue of fact by denying that it was indeed her signature

we see at the bottom of the "As Is - No Warranty" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing
Promised" disclaimers. This too is a red herring. Upon Capato's request, all documents
in defendants' possession bearing Capato's signature were transferred to Capato for handwriting analysis. Since then, there has been no evidence offered that these are not her
signatures at the bottom of these documents. R. 92 and 129. In other words, the only
evidence that these are not her signatures is her own testimony. Capato's unsupported
testimony alone is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated regarding summary judgment:
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment
. . . based on the lack of proof of material fact, the judge must ask himself
not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakenly favors one side over the
other, but whether a fair minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff
on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence
in support of plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is
entitled to a verdict.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (emphasis added). In other
words, if the non-moving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out a triable
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issue of fact, a trial on the issue would be useless and the moving party entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. Further, the Utah Supreme Court states:
An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions
and which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue of
fact.
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985).
Regardless of any dispute surrounding the signatures on the "As Is - No Warranty"
and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimers, there is no dispute as to whether
Capato signed the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. R. 129, A. 14. She admits she signed
it. Id. She signed the contract in three separate places. R.63 and 97, A. 1. Her signatures are dated June 1, 1996. Id. The contract of sale has two express disclaimers of
warranty. See id. p. 8; R. 63-64 and 97-98; A. 1-2. Therefore, even if this Court accepts
Capato's assertion that there is a factual dispute regarding the signatures on the "As Is No Warranty" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" disclaimers, there is no dispute
Capato signed the contract of sale which, by its own terms, disclaims and clearly enunciates the absence of any warranty on the Mercedes.
Finally, it should be pointed out that her confirmed signature on the contract of sale
is identical to her signatures on the "As Is" and "Nothing Owed" disclaimers. See R. 129,
61-63, and 98-101; A. 14, 1-3. Upon inspection of these documents and signatures, this
Court will find that clearly the signatures on all the documents are from the same hand.
As such, this Court may conclude, without the assistance of a handwriting expert, that
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Capato's denial that she signed the disclaimers is false testimony. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-25-10;2 see also Tucker v. Kellog, 28 P. 870, 870 (Utah 1892) ("[I]f a paper admitted
to be in the handwriting of the party, or to have been subscribed by, is in evidence . . .,
the signature or paper in question may be compared by the jury, with or without the aid
of experts.") Further, if Capato has testified falsely, the remainder of her testimony may
be disregarded except as corroborated by other credible evidence. JIFU 3.13 (citing
Gittens v. Lundberg, 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955)). Consequently, Capato's lack of corroborating evidence undercuts her argument that a factual dispute exists over the signatures
on the disclaimers.
C.

Defendants Made No Express Warranties to Capato.
The pivotal question is "did the parties agree to a warranty?" In answering this

question, the court must look to the written contract. U. C. C. Series, Article 2, p. 588
(citations omitted). Written on the signed contractual documents in bold, black, oversized
print are the words "NO WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED," "AS IS NO WARRANTY," and "Nothing owed/Nothing promised." R. 61, 63-64, 97-98, 99,
and 101; A. 1-5. In addition to the clear terms, Capato asked about warranties, to which
defendants answered there is none. R. 129-31; A. 14-16. She knew she could purchase
a warranty and chose not to do so. Id.

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-10 reads: If the subscribing witness denies or does not
recollect the execution of the writing, its execution may still be proved by other evidence.
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Express warranties are not created when the facts show that any such warranties
were taken out of the sales agreement. Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d
65 (Idaho 1983). Citing Comment No. 3 of U.CC. Section 2-313, the Idaho Supreme
Court stated:
Express warranties will not be created when there is clear proof of some
fact which took the affirmation or description out of the agreement, . . .
Id. at 71 {emphasis added). Undoubtedly, plaintiffs signatures on the "No Warranty,
Express or Implied. . .," "As Is - No Warranty," and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised"
disclaimers is just such a fact.
Under Jensen, any alleged express warranty would be extinguished by Capato's
acknowledgment of the disclaimers. Jensen negates Capato's claim that a statement that
the car had been "checked out" or was a "perfect car" was an express warranty. R. 132;
A. 17. Although defendants deny ever representing to Capato that the car was "perfect"
or had undergone Garff s used car inspection, in any event, such statements would not
constitute an express warranty in the wake of the signed disclaimers. See Jensen.
Furthermore, defendants' alleged statements that the Mercedes was a "perfect car,"
"well taken care of," "well maintained," "inspected," and "in the Garff family" do not
rise to the level of express warranties. R. 132. In Royal Business Machines, Inc. v.
Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1980), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals states:
General statements to the effect that goods are "the best," or are "of good
quality," or will "last a lifetime" and be "in perfect condition" are generally
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regarded as expressions of the seller's opinion or "the puffing of his wares"
and do not create an express warranty.
Id at 42.
Additionally, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
recently stated that statements such as "ABS brakes are 99 percent more effective than
other protective systems" and "the driver is 100 times more likely to benefit from this
vehicle's crash-avoidance capabilities" are not express warranties and cannot support a
warranty cause of action. In re General Motors Anti-Lock Brake Products Liability
Litigation, 965 F.Supp. 1525 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
Contrary to Capato's beliefs, this sale does not create a guarantee that all parts of
this car will last forever. Furthermore, Capato received and signed a list of some major
defects that may occur in her vehicle. R. 62 and 100; A. 3. Included in this list is a risk
of a "faulty transmission or drive shaft." Id. This would encompass the flex disk that
Capato alleges failed. In other words, plaintiff was well aware of the potential for defects
and breakdowns in her used vehicle. The concept that parts fail in an older, highly used
vehicle is not a novel one.
Capato attempts to transform the express warranty issue into a jury question.
Contrary to Capato's assertion, there is no jury question here. The documents signed by
Capato make one thing clear above all else — "NO WARRANTY."
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D.

Advertisements Are Not Express Warranties for Old Cars.
Capato argues that Garff s advertisements constitute an express warranty. This is

not the case. Logic alone tells us that any Garff advertisement could not be construed as
an express warranty that parts on a ten-year-old car with 129,000 miles on it will perform
forever. Although advertisements may constitute express warranties in instances of new
products advertised for a certain use, this is not the case here. The cases plaintiff cites
illustrate this point as all involve written representations as to the quality of new goods
sold. See, Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65 (Idaho 1983) (purchase of
a new mobile home); Touchet Valley Grain v. Opp & Seibold, 831 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1992)
(collapse of a new grain storage building); Deaton, Inc. v. Arrowglide Corp., 657 P.2d
109 (N.M. 1982) (purchase of new pickup truck that had modifications); State By Division
of Consumer Protection v. GAP, Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988) (installation of new
asphalt shingles). It should be pointed out that none of these cases stands for the
proposition that generic statewide advertisements create infinite express warranties on
ten-year-old used cars. See Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So.2d 951 (Ala. 1995)
(National advertisements regarding the quality of Chrysler Fifth Avenue and the
accompanying warranty did not give rise to fraudulent misrepresentation claim after
vehicle broke down after less than one year of use).
Interestingly, Capato cites to Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960)
to support her argument that Garff s advertisement was a promise to respond in damages
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in the occurrence of a future event. Welchman is not applicable because in this case the
future event would be the failure of a used car part. Although an interesting argument,
logic alone tells us an advertisement is not a guarantee that a ten-year-old used car will last
forever and if it does not, the advertiser is liable at any point in the future.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS
A MATTER OF LAW.
Summary judgment also requires that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). As a matter of law, the "No Warranty, Express
or Implied," "As Is - No Warranty," and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" terms of
sale, the lack of a defective product, and the lack of any evidence of fraud negate all of
Capato's claims.
A.

The "No Warranty. Express or Implied" and "As Is - No Warranty"
Language Terminated All Implied and Express Warranties.
Capato contends that the "No Warranty, Express or Implied" and "As Is - No

Warranty" disclaimers apply only to implied warranties. This is not the case. Utah Code
Ann. § 70A-2-316(3)(a) includes the termination of express as well as implied warranties.
Under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(3)(a), adopted verbatim at Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-316(3)(a), "No Warranty, Express or Implied," "As Is - No Warranty," and
"Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised" effectively exclude any and all warranty claims Capato
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asserts. 77A CJS Sales, § 270 (citations omitted). Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316(3)(a)
reads:
(a)
Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties
are excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or other language
which in common understanding calls all the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain there is no implied warranty.
(Emphasis added.)
Although a statute specifically states "implied warranties" it also makes reference
to "the exclusion of warranties." The language indicates that all warranties can be
excluded by "No Warranty" and "As Is"- type terms. This is supported by Official
Comment No. 7 to U.C.A. § 2-316 which states:
7.
(a) of Subsection (3) deals with general terms such as "as is," "as
they stand," "with all faults," and the like. Such terms in ordinary
commercial uses are understood that the buyer takes "the entire risk as
to the quality of the goods involved."
(Emphasis added.)

The term "entire risk" leaves little doubt that "As Is" and

"No Warranty" can exclude express, as well as implied warranties. Case law affirms this
point.

As an example, in Nick Miklacki Const. Co. v. M.J.L. Truck Sales, Inc.,

515 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio App. 1986), the Ohio Court of Appeals used Comment No. 7 as the
basis for holding that "As Is" was an effective disclaimer of express and implied
warranties. In Miklacki, the buyer of a used dump truck, which was advertised as having
a rebuilt engine, experienced engine trouble shortly after purchase. However, because the
truck was sold "As Is," the buyer could not hold the seller liable for the cost of repairing
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the truck. The buyer in Miklacki, like the plaintiff, argued that "As Is" applies only to
implied warranties. However, the court responded that "As Is" also can entail the
termination of any express warranties. Id.
Also, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the
"As Is" provision of a contract for sale of used school buses precluded claims for breach
of implied or express warranties. In Trailways Finance and Acceptance Corp. v. Euro-flo
Tours, 572 F.Supp 1227 (D.N.J. 1983), the court stated:
The language of the "As Is" provision of the contract precisely precludes
claims of misrepresentation or breach of any express or implied warranties
of fitness or merchantability.
Id. at 1230.
Similarly, the Florida Court of Appeals held that where certain documents signed
by a Volkswagen car buyer provided the dealer with selling the car "As Is" and was
disclaiming all warranties and that the only warranty on the car was that of the manufacturer, the dealer effectively avoided the making of any warranties. Frank Griffin
Volkswagen, Inc. v. Smith, 610 So.2d 597 (Fla. App. 1992).
Finally, the California Court of Appeals held that a written agreement in which a
skier accepted rental equipment "As Is" exculpated the rental company from any liability
for breach of express or implied warranty. Westlye v. Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal.Rptr.2d
781 (Ca. App. 1993). In Westlye, the skier, like Capato, brought claims for breach of
express and implied warranty after the alleged failure of ski bindings. The skier, like
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Capato, signed a written agreement which clearly indicated the bindings were provided
"As Is." Upholding the trial court's dismissal of the warranty claims against the rental
shop, the court stated:
The trial court determined the written agreement barred these counts as
against Klein's. We agree with the trial court that the written agreement on
its face exculpates Klein's from any liability for warranty liability.
Id at 800.
As for Utah, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld an auto dealer's disclaimer of all
of its warranties under UCA § 70A-2-316. In Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, 681
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984), the Court enforced Rick Warner's express disclaimers of
warranties contained in the sales contract. The court stated:
As a matter of law, these disclaimers effectively limited plaintiff's remedy
to the manufacturer's express warranties, discussed above.
Id. at 1278 (citing UCA § 70A-2-316). Although in Billings, the sales contract did not
contain the term "As Is," the Court nevertheless acknowledged an auto dealer's ability to
limit the dealers warranties associated with the sale of an auto. In the present case,
defendant Garff did exactly what the courts have always approved of — namely,
disclaiming any warranty via the "No Warranty, Express or Implied," "As Is - No
Warranty," and "Nothing Promised/Nothing Owed" provisions of the sales contract.
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B.

Plaintiff Has No Strict Liability Claim Because the Car Was Not Defective.
Capato argues that her strict liability claim survives the "As Is - No Warranty"

disclaimer. However, Capato's argument lacks one crucial and necessary element —
a defective product. Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1) and (2) reads:
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage
allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
(1)

No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a defective
condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer
or other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the
product which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer.

(2)

As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the product
was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by
the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer, or user of that product in
that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge,
training, or experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or
consumer.

See also, Nay v. General Motors Corp., GMC Truck £>/v., 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993)
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1)) (failure of steering in new truck with approximately
1,000 miles on it).
A used Mercedes-Benz is not a defective product. There is no indication that
Capato's Mercedes was defective at the time the product was sold new in 1986.
Furthermore, there is no evidence the car was defective or that the defendants had or
should have had any knowledge of defects at the time was car was sold to Capato. This
vehicle drove without incident for 129,000 miles. It was not as if the part failed after one
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month and only 1,000 miles as in Nay, supra.

A ten-year-old Mercedes-Benz is

undoubtedly not an "unreasonably dangerous" product in any community nor is it
"dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated by" Capato. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-15-6(2). The trial judge agreed stating: "I would expect that car to go 300,000
miles because it is a Mercedes-Benz." R. 131; A. 16. Furthermore, it should be pointed
out that Capato had the car independently safety inspected prior to her purchase. Id. It
passed the safety inspection. Id.
Capato argues the "No Warranty" and "As Is" disclaimers do not preclude her
personal injury claim. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11. To make this argument, Capato
must pin her claim to a defective product. Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes,
Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 652 (Okla. 1990). In support, Capato cites to Waggoner and Wade
v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991). These cases show the fundamental flaw in her
argument. Waggoner and Wade are defective products/product liability cases. As stated
above, a ten-year-old Mercedes is not a defective product by any community's standards.
Capato maintains it would be "unconscionable" to limit defendants' liability for injuries
caused by a defective product. See Brief of Appellant, p. 11. In fact, what is truly
"unconscionable" is Capato's assumption that the vehicle was defective and Capato's
explanation that all parts of a ten-year-old car would work without fail for an infinite
period of time. There is no defective product in this case. Therefore, there is no avenue
of liability on these grounds.
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Capato attempts to create a factual dispute that this product was indeed defective.
This argument is a red herring. As such, it should not preclude the trial court's summary
judgment.
C.

The As Is - No Warranty Disclaimer Precludes Capato's Negligence Claim.
Under the "No Warranty, Express or Implied" and "As Is - No Warranty" terms

of sale, Capato bore the entire risk of the quality of the Mercedes. Under "As Is No Warranty" reads:
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer assumes
no responsibility for any repairs regardless of any oral statements about the
vehicle.
R. 61 and 99; A. 3. As set forth in greater detail above, "As Is" when used in ordinary
commercial usage means "the buyer takes the 'entire risk as to the quality of the goods
involved.'" Official Comment No. 7 of U.C.C. § 2-316 adopted at Utah Code Ann.
§ 70A-2-316(3)(a). The failure of parts is a risk of ownership of an older automobile. If
plaintiff did not wish to take this risk, she could have spent her $10,000.00 on a new car
rather than a ten-year-old Mercedes-Benz. This was a risk Capato knowingly and voluntarily accepted. R. 129-32; A. 14-17.
This risk entailed the quality of the goods at the time of sale. R. 61, 63-64, 98, and
99; A. 1-4. Inclusive in the quality of the car at the time of sale was the service performed
over the ten-year life of the car. Capato has presented no evidence beyond her unsupported assertion in her complaint that the defendants were either negligent in their alleged
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inspection of the car or that that negligence had any relation to the accident and damages
suffered by Capato. As stated above, a single unsupported assertion by the non-moving
party is not sufficient to create a jury issue. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All
U.S. 242, 248 (1986) and Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723. This is not a res ipsa loquitur
case.
Capato argues that the exclusion of implied warranties does not preclude a negligence claim. Brief of Appellant, p. 10. She is incorrect. Indeed, warranty and negligence
claims are separate causes of action but, as in this case, clear and explicit disclaimers can
abrogate both. Interestingly, one of the cases Capato cites supports this point. In Elite
Professional v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195 (Kan. App. 1992), the court acknowledged
contracting parties' ability to disclaim warranties as well as the ability to disclaim liability
for their own negligence as long as done clearly and unequivocally. The court states:
. . . [Effective disclaimer of liability for one's own negligence, waiver of
liability of the other party for the latter's negligence, or indemnification of
the other party for its negligence is subject to strict construction and explicit
expression.
Id. at 1202 (citations omitted).
D.

Capato Has No Fraud Claim.
Although Capato has alleged fraudulent representation, she has not alleged or

presented any evidence that these representations induced her to purchase the Mercedes
or that they were a "basis of the bargain." Without such a showing, Capato has no fraud
claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313; TSl Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah
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Ct. App. 1994) (Failure to show lessee's representations induced the lessor to sign the
lease negates fraud claim). The basis of the bargain between Capato and Holbrook is
contained in the contract of sale and the "As Is" and "Nothing Owed/Nothing Promised"
disclaimers and an odometer statement showing 126,850 miles. Any alleged statements
and advertisements above and beyond the clear terms of the sale are not express warranties
and do not give rise to a fraud cause of action. Mason v. Chrysler Corp., 653 So. 2d 951
(Ala. 1995) (National advertisements regarding the quality of Chrysler Fifth Avenue and
the accompanying warranty did not give rise to fraudulent misrepresentation claim after
vehicle broke down after less than one year of use.)
Capato cites to Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) for the proposition that
her fraud claim survives the "As Is" disclaimers. The facts and disclaimer mLamb are
far different than those presently at hand. Unlike the present case, in Lamb, the seller's
fraudulent conduct went to the basis of the bargain. The seller represented to the buyers
that the bull they were buying was a "breeder" when in fact the seller knew he was sterile.
The Lamb jury found the seller had willfully misrepresented the reproductive capabilities
of the bull to the buyer and therefore, the appellate court held the contract of sale's
exclusive remedy provision did not apply. There was no "As Is" disclaimer on the bull.
In contrast, Capato knew the Mercedes was a ten-year-old car, it had 126,850 miles, was
purchased "As Is," and parts of the car might fail in the not-so-distant future. See R. 130
(citing Deposition of Capato, p. 54), 62, and 100; A. 15 and 4. In other words, unlike the
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buyer in Lamb, Capato knew the bull was sterile. In Lamb, the disclaimer was obtained
through deceit. Consequently, its effect was negated. Such is not the case here.
IX. CONCLUSION, WITH STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Based on the foregoing, the defendants respectfully submit the trial court's decision
was correct and should be affirmed by this court.
DATED this

15 day of October, 1998.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
N- IjC^cM^jrt^
By:_
Robert H. Henderson

Scott H. Martin
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Garff
Enterprises and Tena Holbrook
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INTEREST RATE BETWEEN
2 5 . 9 Q , AND _ _ ? _ _ _ _ _ _ % PER ANNUM TERM BETWEEN

10 TRADE IN ALLOWANCE
11 BALANCE OWED ON TRADE IN*

?4
BETWEEN $

VIN #2

ON A DOWN PAYMENT OF $

12 NET ALLOWANCE ON TRADE IN (line 10 minus 11)

5000.00
5000.00)

13 DEPOSIT/CASH DOWN PAYMENT (omitamt line 8)
14 TOTAL CREDITS

(total lines 12 & 13)

M53.0ff

15 SUB TOTAL FROM LINE 9
16 SERVICE CONTRACT
17
18 SUB TOTAL-TAXABLE ITEMS
19 TRADE ALLOWANCE (line 10)

9453.00

(total lines 15 17)

20 NET TAXABLE AMOUNT
(line 18 minus line 19)

9453.00
* 579.00
32.50

21 UTAH SALES/USE TAX ON "TAXABLE AMOUNT"
22 LICENSE & REGISTRATION FEES
23 PROPERTY TAX DUE ON TRADE IN
24 STATE INSPECTION/EMISSIONS TEST
25 STATE WASTE TIRE RECYCLING FEE

MONTHS AND _ ^ ?
238.97
PER MONTH AND $

MONTHS MONTHLY PAYMENTS
963.97
PER MONTH BASED

5000.00

IF SELLER IS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE FINANCING WITHIN THE TERMS DISCLOSED THEN
SELLER MUST WITHIN SEVEN CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF SALE MAIL NOTICE TO THE
PURCHASER THAT HE/SHE HAS NOT BEEN ABLETO ARRANGE FINANCING PURCHASER THEN
HAS 14 DAYS FROM DATE OF SALE TO ELECT IF HE/SHE CHOOSES TO RESCIND THE
CONTRACT OF SALE PURSUANT TO SECTION 41 3 401
IN ORDER TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT OF SALE THE PURCHASER SHALL
(1) RETURN TO SELLER THE MOTOR VEHICLE PURCHASED
(2) PAY THE SELLER 30 CENTS FOR EACH Ml LE THE MOTOR VEHICLE HAS BEEN DRIVEN AND
(3) COMPENSATE SELLER FOR ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE
IN RETURN SELLER SHALL GIVE BACK TO THE PURCHASER ALL PAYMENTS OR OTHER
CONSIDERATION PAID BY THE PURCHASER INCLUDING ANY DOWN PAYMENT AND ANY
MOTOR VEHICLE TRADED IN IF THE TRADE IN HAS BEEN SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF
BEFORE THE PURCHASER RESCINOS THE TRANSACTION THEN THE SELLER SHALL RETURN
TO THE PURCHASER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO THE ALLOWANCE TOWARD THE PURCHASE
PRICE GIVEN BY THE SELLER FOR THE TRAOE IN AS NOTED IfTTrTE DOCUMENT OF SALE

24.00

*

26 FEDERAL LUXURY TAX
27 DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE
28
29 TOTAL OF ALL ITEMS ABOVE
30 TOTAL CREDITS

'149.00

*

(lines 18 21 27)
(line 14)

31 B A L A N C E D U E
(total line 29 minus 30)
DAY
Q 4 MONTH
JTJEP9
96
Purchaser has arranged insurance on vehicle through .

(

•1U2J/.50
>5000.0Q
5237.50
. insurance company Policy!

As is stated on the reverse side of this document unless Seller has given to Purchaser an Express Warranty in writing Sellermakes no Warranty express or implied with respect to the merchantability
fitness for particular purpose or otherwise concerning the vehicle parts or accessones descnbed herein Unless otherwise indicated in writing any warranty is limited to that provided by the
manufacturer if any as explained and conditioned by Paragraph 4 on the reverse side hereof
Purchaser agrees that this contract includes all of the terms conditions and warranties on both the face and reverse side hereof that this agreement cancels and supersedes any pnor agreement and as of
the date hereof comprises the complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the subject matters covered herBby\PURCHASER BY HIS/HER EXECUTION OF THIS
AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGES THAT HE/SHE HAS READ ITS TERMS CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES BOTH ON THE FACE AND WyREVJfiSE SIDE HEREOF AND HAS RECEIVED A TRUE
C O P Y ^ F W S AGREEMENT AND FURTHER AGREES TO PAY THFJBAkANCE DUE" SET FORTH ABOVE ON OR BEFORE THE D//
STATURE
" N
Q^PUWCHASER^-iSIGNATURE
OF CO PURCHASER .

r-?G

> CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES

'«33

I T I S ^ F U R T H E R UNDERSTOOD AND MUTUALLY AGREED:'
-V The agreement on the reverse side hereof is subjectto the following terms, conditions, and warranties made by Purchaser, which
x
have been mutually agreed upo^'^f^v^cy-MClO^
'-'^
^'
.*••.•"• - • • - ; : '
/.
• y-*v

• - : ~ - v : . : : * • • • • • > • v/iv • . i ^

• --.•-.v.«v„.

•-:

•:••••*.'••*•••. j ;

v

.-•«-, o > j r

1. Purchaser agrees to deliver the original bill of sale and the title to any used vehicle traded herein along with the delivery of
.. . such vehicle in the same condition and containing the same equipment as when appraised reasonable wear and tear
excepted, and Purchaser warrants such used vehicle to be his property free and clear of all liens and encumbrances excepf
'\
as otherwise noted on the reverse side h e r e o t - ^ o y ^
v ^ ..;: : ;
v~>:z£
2. If the Seller does not pay the "BALANCE DUE" by the date indicated on the reverse side of this agreement, then the Seller may
set off against it's damages any cash deposit or down payment received from the Purchaser. In the event a used vehicie has'
been taken in trade, Purchaser authorizes Seller to sell the used vehicle, and Seller shall be entitled to reimburse itself out of
the proceeds of such sale for its expenses and losses incurred or suffered as the result of Purchaser's failure to complete tha
purchase.
. *•'. •'•':':*-o;'
' •• •'''" "•-•'•'.' : •'•'••'••' * .
-•
• . •. • - T > . \

*. , . . , . . . . - , i ; . v : . v ^ - : - • • : • > * • • > y

:

..•-.,-

• -

-

-';•.

vr

3. Seller shall not be liable for delays or damages caused by the manufacturer, accidents, sureties,fires,or other causes beyond
;
thecontrolofiheSellef.[Tv'V; j ; * ; -jv:
:"./;;:
^ *
"."*'•.-.'
4. NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE OR WILL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY EITHER SELLER
OR THE MANUFACTURER OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER^
EXCEPTING ONLY THE CURRENT PRINTED WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO SUCH VEHICLE OR VEHICLE CHASSIS,;
WHICH WARRANTY IS INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF AND A COPY OF WHICH WILL BE
DELIVERED TO PURCHASER AT THE TIME OF DELIVERY OF THE NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE
CHASSIS, SUCH WARRANTY SHALL BE EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY OTHER WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,;
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY IMPJJED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, AND THE REMEDIESPSET FORTH IN SUCH WARRANTY WILL BE THE ONLY REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ANY
PERSON WITH RESPECT TO SUCH NEW MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS.
NO WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE BY SELLER WITH RESPECT TO USED MOTOR VEHICLES OR
MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNDER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY SELLER FOR
SUCH USED MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR VEHICLE CHASSIS, WHICH WARRANTY, IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING, IS
INCORPORATED HEREIN AND MADE A PART HEREOF.
5. In case the vehicle sold to Purchaser is a used or demonstrator vehicle, no warranty or representation is made by Seller as to
the extent such vehicle has been used, regardless of the mileage shown on the odometer of said used vehicle.
* 6.

In the event it becomes necessary for Seller to enforce any of the terms, conditions or warranties in this agreement, Purchaser
agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and court costs.

7. Purchaser may not transfer or assign his/her interest in this Agreement, unless Seiler consents in writing.
8. LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY AND
AGREEMENT.

DAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS

9. Purchaser REPRESENTS that he/she is 18 years of age or older.
10.

Purchaser grants to Seiler a purchase money security interest in the purcha sed vehicle and to any proceeds of the vehicle to
secure full payment of the purchase price. This security interest covers all equipment, accessories, and parts that Purchaser
adds to the vehicle-Purchaser also grants Seller a security interest in the proceeds of any physical damage insurance policy
.on the vehicle.

11.

if the vehic'e bought by Purchaser is a used vehicle, the information you see en the window form [Buyer's Guide] for this
vehicle :s part of this contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary previsions in this contract of sale.

12.

IN THE CASE OF ANY VEHICLE TRADED IN AS PART OF THE CONSIDERATION TCV/ARD A PURCHASE, PURCHASER
REPRESENTS AND WARRANTS:
(a) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT,
AIR EAGS AND ALL SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT INSTALLED BY THE MANUFACTURER HAS NOT BEEN
REMOVED OR RENDERED INOPERATIVE:
(b) THAT THE YEAR OF MANUFACTURE AND THE BALANCE OWED ON THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE ARE AS STATED ON
THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF;
(c) THAT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DISCLOSED ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, THE ODOMETER READING ACCUR- ATELY STATES ACTUAL MILES THE TRADED-IN VEHICLE HAS BEEN- DRIVEN; y
(d) THAT PURCHASER HAS AND WILL PROVIDE TO SELLER GOOD TITLE TO THE TRADED-}?. VEHICLE, AND THAT
TRANSFER OF THETRADED-IN VEHICLETO SELLER AS A TRADE-IN ON THE PUg^HASE OF ANOTHER VEHICLE IS
RIGHTFUL; AND
(e) THAT THE TRADED-IN'VEHICLTHAS NEVER HAD ITS TITLE OR REGISTRATION BRANDED AS "SALVAGED",
"RESTORED," "REPAIRED," OR SIMILAR TERM, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §§41-1a-1«04 AND 41-ta-1005
OR STATUTE(S) OF ANOTHER STATE SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR IN CONTEXT. \r PURCHASER BREACHES THIS •
REPRESENTATION AND WARRANTY THEN PURCHASER AGREES TO Sc LIABLE TOR AND PAY r r i c SELLER THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TRADE-IN ALLOWANCE AS STATED ON THE REVERSE "IDE A><D THE REDUCED
VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION REGARDJNG THE TITLE OF; REGISTRATION.

"'?.. ~.K :'" --:-'': ' otv'.T":^ th?. SaJ-ers security interest in the ve^d-? purchased hy °-..:.-ch-:«=««• r;-r v^*;- c-jrycr.^ -'s.:cL.'i~g Seiier
• •:;:•'- v •:-.:>:•:, ~r-x;;/v.v^y cs^sed by ^•^hsse'-'s breach, ;f any. of the *-;?:•:•'•••:• -•?•>.: r i;••- prs-cecics •^•a'^apn.
-c or - ' - 'r.e-se s^oc Vc-reo? sr.za r.e. rieerr^i .••eu$-:.r\3b!e and effec.ve rx/.'.*'::~v.z-\
j •:••• -•?. vf 3 v s r : : :c .--ste, if therein '.
v.;' , v ,y r~ .*rv ,:,*..-. ;-,;., ret.'-'; *•:«••. -—•ese-Tn^ financing to provide ?;ie c*:.-•:-';:i.-:.:^Sv:?••.:. .-e^.-sd bylaw, .

("A

Tab 2

4.3

BUYERS GUIDE
IMPORTANT: Spoken promises are difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer to put all promises in writing. Keep
this form.
^
MODEL

VEHICLE MAKE

VIN NUMBER

GrCO\°\
DEALER STOCK NUMBER (Ofrtonri)

WARRANTIES FOR THIS VEHICLE:

AS IS-NO WARRANTY
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer assumes no responsibility for any repairs
regardless of any oral statements about the vehicle.

WARRANTY
• FULL •

LIMITED WARRANTY. The dealer will pay
% of the labor and
% of the parts for the
covered systems that fail during the warranty period. Ask the dealer for a copy of the warranty
document for a full explanation of warranty coverage, exclusions, and the dealer's repair
obligations. Under state law, "implied warranties" may give you even more rights.

SYSTEMS COVERED:

DURATION:

D SERVICE CONTRACT. A service contract is available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Ask for
details as to coverage, deductible, price, and exclusions. If you buy a service contract within 90 days of
the time of sale, state law "implied warranties" may give you additional rights.
PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE THIS VEHICLE INSPECTED BY
YOUR MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE LOT.
SEE THE BACK OF THIS FORM for important additional information, including a list of some major defects
that may occur in used motor vehicles.'
FORM BGE-1
To Order Forms CALL

INSIDE WASHINGTON
1-800-422-8217
OUTSIDE WASHINGTON 1-800-826-7095

7 DAYS A WEEK
24 HOURS A DAY

WHOLESALE FORMS
PATENT NO 4864755

L\

Below is a list of some major defects that may occur in used motor vehicles.
Frame & Body
Frame-cracks, corrective welds, or rusted through
Dogtracks-bent or twisted frame
Engine
O.' 'eakage excluding normal seepage
Cracked biock o r head
Belts miss ng or inoperable
Knocks or misses rela'ed to camsnaft ''fters and oush rods
Aonormal exhaust discharge

Transmission & Drive Shaft
Improper f'uid Ipvel or leakage, excludmg norma' seepage
C r acx*a or damaged case which is v s ble
Abnormal ro.se or vibration causec by faulty transmission
or dnve shaft
Improper shifting or fund oning n any gear
Manua' c Jtch si os or cnatters

Differential
l^rrop^ f o d level or lca*>age exdud ng norma: seepage
C nckec or damaged housing ,vh ch s visible
A c n e na '«o se or vibiatcn caused by faulty d*fe r ent.a!

Brake System
Failure warning light broken
Pedal not firm under pressure (DOT specs)
'Not enough pedal reserve (DOT specs }
Does not stop vehicle in straight line (DOT specs)
Hoses damaged
Drum or rotor too thin (Mfgr specs)
Lining or pad thickness less than 1 '32 inch
Power unit not operating o r leaking
Structural or mechanical parts damaged
Steering System^
Too much free play at steering wheel (DOT specs)
Free play in linkage more than 1/4 -rich
Steer.ng gear b nds or jams
Front wheel al.gned improperly (DOT specs)
Power unit belts cracked or slipping
Power unit fluid level improper
Suspension System
Ba!1 joirt seals damaged
Structural parts bent or damaged
Stabilizer bar disconnected
Spring broken
Shock absorber r cur ting loose
Rjfcber busnirgs damaged or m ssr.g
Radius rod damages or missing
Shcck abscber leaking c r fu r ct or ng improperly

Cooling System
^eakag-* 'nclud ng radiator
!nprcf:c r j 'jT.t'onmg water pump

Tires
Tread depth less than 2/32 inch
Sizes mismatched
Visible damage

Electrical System
Battery leakage
lmproperly function ng a'ternaic, generator, battery, or staler

Wheels
Visib'e C T X K S damage or repa rs
Mounting bolts loose or m ssing
Exhaust System
Leakage

Fuel System
Vis b e 'e3Kage
Inoperable Accessories
Gauges or w a n ng dev :es
Air conditioner
Hea'e' & Defroster

b E - f - O H COVr

AIN T S

IMPORTANT: The information on tnis form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this label
before consumer purchase (except for purpose of test-driving) is a violation of federal law (16 C.F.R. £55).

CUS"!OVCR SIGNATURE _ C

*=d£

^

*EGEIPTOFGR.GWALCC

KAO^.LEUGCD

Tab 3

**Z~umiNSLaB

F O R M S (801) 466-9609

GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC,

VOID
AFTER
THIS DATE

OLDSMOBILE • HYUNDAI
SAAB • MERCEDES-BENZ • VOLVO
JAGUAR • HONDA

WE OWE YOU

/

/

WORK PROMISED TO BE PERFORMED AT TIME OF SALE

t

TEl

. I

i DESCRIPTION OF CA5

L.CENSE a

i

CwSTC'-'E^S NAME

SALESMAN

rVNX

STCC< •

I£p2fl^

2.

NoWtn^ cM^A
4.

7.
NOTE: THE ABOVE PROMISED WORK IS
ADDITIONAL WORK WILL BE CHARGED

E ONLY WORK TO BE PERFORMED FREE OF CHARGE. ANY

DUE TO I N S U R A N C E X E G U L A T I O N S — NO LOAN CARS AVAILABLE
Signed: Sales Mgr.

•X-

Signed: Custome

M

Tab 4

ODOMETER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Federal and State law require that you state the mileage upon transfer of
ownership. Failure to complete or providing a false statement may result in
fines and/or imprisonment.

I, KEN GARFF DWNTWN

, (transferor's
name, Print) state that the odometer of the vehicle described below now reads:
ODOMETER READING !

(NO TENTHS)

126853

miles and to the best of my knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the
vehicle described below, unless one of the following statements is checked.
Check one box only:
[ I (1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading
reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits.
I

I (2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is not the actual mileage.
WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY.
BODY TYPE

|MODEL

| MAKE"

" ""

SO

MF.RfK

VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

YEAR

1986

WDBDA24DXGF221523
KENPr nted
GAPFF
Name

Transferor's Signature (SELLER)

I^^WNTOWNT

531 SOUTH STATE
Transferor's Address (Street)

Salt Lake City, UT

84111

Oty

ZIP Code

State

DATE OF STATEMENT

0 1 JUN 1996

CA^CU
Transferee's Signature (BUYER)

'Sutdes,

CA9ATCO

Printed Name

CAROL S . CAPATO
Transferee's Name

1787 E. LINCOLN LN
Transferee's Address (Street)

HOLIADAY, UT 84124
City

"]

State

ZIP Code

1

Tab 5

A.I
Third .lifiwai District

MAR 1 6 1998
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CAROL CAPATO,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO. 970901748

Plaintiff/
vs.
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC./ KEN
GARFF/ TENA HOLBROOK and
DOES 1 through 10 inclusive,
Defendants•

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment comes before the Court
pursuant to Rule 4-501.

Oral argument was had on March 2, 1998,

and thereafter the entire deposition of plaintiff was submitted to
the Court for review in support of the Motion.
Defendant has provided credible evidence that the plaintiff
signed a Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, which specifically says
that the buyer has seen a copy of the FTC Used Car Buyers Guide.
This paragraph was specifically signed by the plaintiff.

Defendant

also submits an "As Is-No Warranty" document, also signed by the
plaintiff, and an additional document entitled "We Owe You" on
which is written "Nothing owed/Nothing promised", which is also
signed by the plaintiff.

Defendant's argument is that plaintiff

purchased a car with no warranties, and therefore has no claims

KM

CAPATO V. GARFF

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

against the defendant for the accidental discharge of the airbag
while the vehicle was operating and any injuries attendant thereto.
Plaintiff responds with a Motion to Compel Discovery and
Motion to Stay, and the argument that defendant's disclaimers don't
apply to the causes of action alleged in the Complaint, including
strict liability, express and implied warranty, negligence and
fraud. Plaintiff relies upon the advertising and marketing done by
defendants to the effect that "We stand behind every car we sell",
"Any purchaser of a used car is entitled to their money back under
certain conditions", and some possible oral representation that
this car was thoroughly checked out before the sale, and such an
inspection would have revealed the defect which resulted in the
airbag deployment.

The plaintiff fails in her deposition, or

otherwise, to clearly specify any specific oral representations or
advertising, or

marketing, which induced her to buy the car.

In

the absence of anything specific to that effect, and with the
clear, written waiver

signed by the plaintiff, defendant is

entitled to Summary Judgment.

Us

4^|

CAPATO V. GARFF

PAGE THREE

MINUTE ENTRY

Counsel for defendant shall prepare an Order consistent with
this ruling.
Dated this

.day of March, 1998.
- ,x
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
\

•

-•

£

/

[•^o

CAPATO V. GARFF

PAGE FOUR

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this

\D

day of March,

1998:

Mark DaIton Dunn
Attorney for Plaintiff
3575 S. Market Street, Suite 206
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Robert H. Henderson
Attorney for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000

f)Jfb^anAQj^\y^^

Tab 6

A\\
Third v\u>- !--;• District

APR 1 h 1998

ROBERT H HENDERSON (A1461)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Garff Enterprises, Inc.,
and Tena Holbrook
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

SAfc-i L^»£-<-^0«M

L^pJ.y Ci«fk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CAROL CAPATO,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 970901748
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC., KEN
GARFF, TENA HOLBROOK and DOES 1
through 10 inclusive,

Judge Stephen L. Henroid

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for pursuant to Rule 4-501
on March 2, 1998. The Court had reviewed the file. The Court fully heard the argument of
counsel. The Court considers itself fully advised.
The Court is of the opinion that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff
purchased the subject vehicle from the defendant "AS - NO WARRANTY" and "NOTHING
OWED/NOTHING PROMISED." Plaintiff attempts to defeat these facts by contending that
defendant has well known advertising in this community to the effect "We stand behind every car

Yv\

we sell," etc. However, the plaintiff fails to clearly specify any specific oral representations or
advertising or marketing which overcome the written motor vehicle contract of sale "AS IS - NO
WARRANTY" and 'NOTHING OWED/NOTHING PROMISED."
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be, and
hereby is, entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, no cause of action, together with
defendants' taxable costs incurred herein in the amount of $ ~~ Q*~

as determined from

Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements submitted separately.
DATED this [4

day o£jSfffCh, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

—-^

STEPHEN L. HENROID , ji 'j
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE • °'-\•/

N \8862\6\ORDER JUD

A>\b

MAILING CERTIFICATE

Donna L. Campbell, employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendant herein; served the attached Proposed ORDER AND JUDGMENT (Case
Number 970901748, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County) upon the parties
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Mark Dalton Dunn
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3575 South Market Street, #206
West Valley City, Utah 84119
and caused the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on t h e 0 j _ dayjof March, 1998

Donna L. Campbell

Us
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Condenselt TM

CAPATO v. GARFF, 9709C ^48 PI

Page 1
1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

• * *

4

CAROL CAPATO,

5

Plaintiff,

6
7

<c

Case No. 970901748 PI

-vsKEN GARFF, et al.,

8

CD

HEARING, 3-2-98

Defendant.

O

9

10
11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 2nd day
of March, 1998, at 9:30 o'clock a.m., this cause came

13

on for hearing before the HONORABLE STEPHEN L.

14

HENRIOD, District Court, without a jury in tBfc Salt

15

Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, Utah

16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S :

18

3>

For the Plaintiff:

MARK D. DUNN
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

ROBERT HENDERSOI
Attorney at Law

Z5

19

en

O SB

21

tCO
o
CO

p-« •**

22

oo

20

23

CAT by:

Page 3
1
MR. HENDERSON: Here it is, a
2 cross-referral to the information you see on the
3 window form, capital "Buyers," capital "Guide" where
4 this vehicle is part of the contract. The
5 information on the window form overrides any contract
6 provisions in the contract of sale. I've received a
7 copy of the FCC Used Car Buyer's Guide signed here by
8 the Plaintiff.
9
Now, Exhibits 2 and 3, Judge, is a front
10 and back side of the Buyer's Guide Form. If I might
11 hand the original of this up to the Court for a
12 moment?
13
This is the as-is, no warranty form.
14 This is the one that Miss Capato said she didn't
15 sign.
16
We think two things, Judge: There is no
17 genuine issue that Miss Capato not only got this form
18 but signed it.
19
THE COURT: Yeah, she's obviously signed
20 it.

2 « 21
22
23
24
25

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

24
25

HEARING, 3-2-98

MR. HENDERSON: We submit - as you know,
we submitted these to handwriting experts who's been
amazingly silent, no affidavit. And in his
Memorandum, Mr. Dunn suggests that I'm not entitled
to any kind of reliance on that. I don't believe

Page 2
1
PROCEEDINGS
2
THE COURT: I think I've read
3 everything. It appears that Ken Garff Enterprises
4 wants me to rule that their advertising, when they
5 say, "We stand behind every car we sell," doesn't
6 mean anything.
7
MR. HENDERSON: That is about it, Your
8 Honor.
9
Could I walk you through the documents,
10 if I might? Do you have, Judge, my Memorandum in
11 Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
12 there? I'd like to start at Tab 1. That's the Motor
13 Vehicle Contract of Sale. And even the Plaintiff,
14 Mrs. Capato, admits she signed this one.
15
By the way, Judge, can I hand you up the
16 original?
17
THE COURT: Yeah. This one is kind of
18 hard to read.
19
MR. HENDERSON: I'll need this one back.
20
THE COURT: That's fine.
21

MR. HENDERSON: I would like to call the

22 Court's attention to the right-hand column under the
23 more bold print about a third of the way down:
24 "Notice only to buyers of used vehicles."
25
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
CARLTON WAY, 801-535-5464

Page 4
1 that to be the case. I didn't do a lot of legal
2 research on this, but I did pull the old JIFU 3.13 on
3 the effective failure to produce available stronger
4 evidence.
5
THE COURT: Plus I understand that the
6 only sworn evidence that the Plaintiff is offering is
7 her deposition.
8
MR. HENDERSON: Correct, Your Honor.
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. DUNN: Correct.

MR. HENDERSON: Now, but even if, even
if, you were to be inclined to say that her denial of
signing this form - which she's obviously signed if
you compare the signature against the Contract of
Sale that she admits she signed — we think we are
entitled to summary judgment anyway for the reasons
that I'm about to state. Back to Exhibit 1, the Sale
Contract. If you'll note, Judge, down at the bottom
on Page 1 just above where she signed, again, the
second paragraph up, it starts out:
"As is stated on the reverse
side of this document, unless seller
has given to purchaser an express
warranty in writing, seller makes no
warranty express or implied with
respect to merchantability, fitness
Page 1 - Page 4
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1
for a particular purpose or otherwise
2
concerning the vehicle.11
3
Now, Judge, if you look at the back side
4 of that form, I believe it is Paragraph No. 4 —
5 unfortunately, I've given you my original.
6
THE COURT: You are right. It is Number
7 4:
8
"No warranties expressed or
9
implied will be deemed to have been
10
been made by either seller or the
11
manufacturer of the new motor
12
vehicle..."
13
MR. HENDERSON: The first paragraph of
14 Paragraph 4 pertains to new vehicles, but the second
15 paragraph pertains specifically to used vehicles. So
16 we are here in a situation where we think that
17 there's no genuine issue that we sold the vehicle as
18 is. But beyond that, the Plaintiff is here with
19 utterly no evidence of any warranty. And beyond
20 that, the Plaintiff's, herself, own sworn testimony
21 at her deposition is highly probative of the fact
22 that she, herself, knew she had no warranty. And I
23 start, Your Honor, at Page 49 where I asked her:
24
"During the time that you were
25
looking into making the acquisition of

1
1
2
3
4
5
6
17
I8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
[25

Page 6
the f 86 Mercedes, did you make any
inquiry to Tina Holbrooke (that was
our salesperson) as to whether there
would be any warranty that attached?"
She says, "Yeah."
And I said, "When was that?"
And Mrs. Capato says:
"I asked if I could have an
extended warranty."
I asked her: "Tell me when that
was."
She said: "The same day I was
acquiring it.
"On June "96?
"Yes.
"You asked Tina?
"Yes.
"For an extended warranty?
"Yes."
And then we continue on over on Page 51:
"So you asked Tina if you could
get an extended warranty. And what
did Tina tell you?
"She would look into it.
"Was this the end of the
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conversation with Tina on that subject
or was there more?"
The answer: "That was basically,
yes, because I was waiting to see if I
could get it."
And then I asked her: "So the
last you heard on your request for an
extended warranty was, 'I will look
intoit?,M
Her answer: "Tm looking,'
yes."
Then I asked her: "Did you
understand that the extended warranty
was something that would have to be
purchased?"
Her answer was: "I didn't mind
purchasing, you know, an extended
warranty. I wanted one."
And then I asked her: "You knew
an extended warranty didn't come for
free?"
She said, "Actually, I didn't
know a whole lot about it. I just
knew it was a good idea. I wanted to
get one. Yes, I knew it didn't come

Page 8
1
for free."
2
"Any other discussions with
3
Tina?"
4
She says, "Not that I can
5
recall."
6
Then on Page 54 of her own deposition,
7 she admits she knew the car was ten years old, had
8 over a hundred thousand miles on it.
9
Then on to Page 55, back to this subject
10 about an extended warranty:
11
"Was any price ever quoted to
12
you about what the extended warranty
13
that you wanted would cost?
14
"No."
15
And then I asked her: "When you
16
went down there, you knew you had a
17
certain amount that you could afford
18
to spend?
19
"Yes.
20
"Was it your intent to acquire a
21
used car?
22
"Yes.
23
"What was the amount you had to
24
spend?
25
"I had $5,000.

Page 5 - Page 8
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1
Now, the interesting thing here: She
2 went out and got her own inspection, Motor Vehicle
3 Safety Inspection, on the car. It passed. And this
4 woman admitted in her deposition that she has worked
5 for at least five years in sales, documenting sales
6 transactions and at one time even worked for a car
7 dealership in sales. I believe it was Wagstaff.
8 This is not a woman who is unsophisticated in
9 documenting contracts of sale.
10
We understand that she had some bad luck
11 with this car, and she's disgruntled. We think, Your
12 Honor, however, she purchased this motor vehicle as
13 is, nothing promised, nothing owed and that we should
14 be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
15
THE COURT: It is your position that the
16 signed disclaimers obviate all of the advertising?
17
MR. HENDERSON: That is our position.
18 And, in fact, there is an integration clause in the
19 Contract of Sale.
20
THE COURT: I know. It is Still
21 troubling to me. I mean, those ads — I know what
22 those ads say. I think everybody who watches
23 television in this community knows what those ads
24 say, and they are very specific.
25
MR. HENDERSON: "We back up every car we

1
"Did you find anything for
2
$5,000?
3
"No."
4
Then, Your Honor, and this is
5 significant, Page 56:
6
"At any time after the 1st of
7
June of '96 up until the 3rd of July,
8
'96" J9
That's when the air bag unfortunately
10 deployedresultingin some, what we consider to be,
11 minor injuries to the Plaintiff, without getting any
12 disagreement here about the nature and extent of
13 those injuries.
14
"-- up until the 3rd of July,
15
did you make any additional efforts
16
torward obtaining the extended
17
warranty?
18
"Yes."
19
I asked her to tell me what.
20
"I called there to ask for Tina,
21
and they would say she was out or with
22
someone and I had to leave a message."
23
Then I go on: "Did you have any
24
conversations with Tina?"
25
Down at the bottom she says:
1
''No, I never got to find out."
2
Basically, this is the
3
Plaintiff: "I never got to find out
4
about the extended warranty."
5
At the top of Page 57: "Did you
6
speak to anyone else at Ken Garff
7
during that time about the subject of
8
your desire to acquire an extended
9
warranty?"
10
Her answer was: "When I asked
11
her or talking to her, this other man
12
who was writing up the papers, the
13
finance guy, was there. I didn't
14 really talk to him about it."
15
And then I asked her a few more questions
16 in the middle of Page 57:
17
"Did you talk to anybody?
18
"Answer: No."
19
So she knew she needed or wanted an
20 extended warranty, and she knew that she didn't have
21 one and didn't pay for one. So, based on the
22 Contract of Sale, based on her not having any
23 warranty, based on her not knowing she didn't have
24 any warranty, we think we are entitled to summary
uS judgment.
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1 sell"?
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
j 2
\ 3
MR. HENDERSON: Your Honor, the
4 interesting thing about that, and I can quote you
5 chapter and verse out of the depositions: This motor
i 6 vehicle did not qualify for the 30 day, 3,000 mile
7 warranty for two reasons: It was too old. This was
8 a ten-year-old vehicle.
9
THE COURT: A ten-year-old Mercedes is
10 not nearly as old as a three-year-old Chevrolet in
11 real terms. It may not qualify for Ken Garff's
12 warranty as a result of that, but it is not like she
13 was buying a junker for $10,000.
14
MR. HENDERSON: Well, the vehicle did
15 have in excess of 125,000 miles on it.
16
THE COURT: If I bought that car, I would
17 expect it to go 300,000 miles because it is a
18 Mercedes Benz.
19
MR. HENDERSON: Well, Your Honor, I would
20 only say this to you, and I understand your
21 feelings 22
THE COURT: I mean, it sounds to me like
23 it's false advertising.
24
MR. HENDERSON: In what regard?
25
THE COURT: Saying, "We back up every car

Page 9 - Page 1£
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1
MR. HENDERSON: Okay.
1 we sell," and then slapping an as-is, no warranties
2
THE COURT: And I'm going to order that
2 sign on the cars on the lot. There is a major
3 her deposition be published and ask that one of you
3 contradiction there.
4 leave me a complete copy.
4
MR. HENDERSON: Well, let me maybe put it
5
MR. DUNN: I didn't bring you one. lean
5 to you in these terms: I have got a couple of kids,
6 provide you with one.
6 I have got four cars. This is hard for me to do. I
!7
Thank you, Your Honor. I believe that
7 have a 16-year-old motor vehicle. I am just putting
8 the Court is aware of our position. Perhaps a couple
8 this in terms of ~ that maybe you can relate to.
9 of things that I would just like to add: Not only
9
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
10 are those advertisements stating that "We back up
10
MR. HENDERSON: Maybe you have a second
11 every car we sell," but there's an additional what we
11 car or a third car for your family. I would suggest
12 feel to be an express warranty in that "We, Ken
12 to you that Miss Capato, who only had $5,000 to
13 Garff, do an inspection of these cars," and that that
13 spend, or other people that are in need of purchasing
14 is really, in part, what they are backing up.
14 a used car, couldn't get into that vehicle for the
15
What we'd like to be able to do is see
15 price she got into it if it isn't an as-is sale.
16 what that inspection is. We believe that the
16 Now, this is the way the world works.
17 inspection may well have — if it were to have
17
THE COURT: You know, that is not the
18 occurred, may well have caught this problem with this
18 issue. The issue is whether or not anybody explained
19 flex seal that should have been at least inspected if
19 that to her.
20 not replaced every 30,000 miles and could have
20
MR. HENDERSON: Beyond as is?
21 prevented this accident. And that's where our point
21
THE COURT: No. What youfvejust started
22 to the motion to compel goes in that we'd like to see
22 explaining to me. I mean, if somebody explained that
23 the advertising which says they will do the
23 to her and she acknowledged understanding it, I'd
24 inspection and what that inspection list includes.
24 probably feel a little differently about her
25 Because if that inspection list includes such a flex
25 situation; although Ken Garffs advertising still

1

Page 14
1 Would trouble me.
2
I'm also troubled by the fact that she
3 signed all these documents and then in her deposition
4 she says she never saw them. But I have a problem
J 5 with the advertising and with this corporation
6 wanting to ignore the fact that they lure the public
7 onto their premises with advertising that would imply
8 that their cars are guaranteed. I mean, it is not
9 going to bother you or me or Mr. Dunn if we go and
10 buy a car, but if one of those kids we are talking
11 about, mine or yours or Mr. Dunn's, goes and buys
12 that same car, they very well could believe, based on
13 thousands of television advertisements, that they are
14 buying a car that has something behind it at Ken
15 Garff. The man's dead now, but his face still
16 carries a lot of credibility on that TV.
17
Do you have case law that says that the
18 written disclaimers supersede the advertising?
19
MR. HENDERSON: It says it right in the
20 contract.
21
THE COURT: That's not what I asked. Do
22 you have any cases?
23
MR. HENDERSON: rm sure I can come up
24 with some, Judge.
|25
THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Dunn.

CARLTON WAY, 801 -535-5464
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1 seal, this action may not have occurred.
2
And also on a point other than the
3 contract is the negligence issue. We believe that
4 they have affirmatively assumed the duty that, "We
5 will inspect every car we sell pursuant to this
6 checklist." They have undertaken that duty. They
7 admittedly did not inspect this car. That brings us
8 to the fact issue. The fact issue is: Was it
9 explained to my client that this was a consignment
j 10 car excluded from all the warranties, excluded from
11 all of the advertisements, excluded from the
12 inspections, or as my client recalls she was
13representedthat this is a perfect car, it has been
14 in the Garff Family, it has been well taken care of,
15 well-maintained and all of these warranties would
16 apply. So, therefore, they've taken the assumption
17 of a duty; admittedly, did not fulfill that duty and
18 personal injuries have occurred.
19
THE COURT: Is it a fact that we agree
20 upon that, that this was not inspected,
21 Mr. Henderson?
22
MR. HENDERSON: No, we don't agree to
23 that. In fact 24
MR. DUNN: I thought we had.
25
MR. HENDERSON: - we don't agree to most

Page 13 - Page 16

Arc
CAPATO v. GARFF, 9709' ?48 PI
1

Condenselt™
Page 17

"^

HEARING, 3-2-98

1 of what Your Honor just put to me. What I have done
2 here is to try to create a situation where we were
3 entitled to summary judgment4
THE COURT: Sure.
5
MR. HENDERSON: - on undisputed facts,
6 because, in fact, Miss Holbrooke has testified under
7 oath that she did explain all of this stuff to the
8 Plaintiff.
9
MR. DUNN: But that was clearly
10 contested. What went on in this deal is clearly
11 contested by the parties. Miss Holbrooke's testimony
12 is — will be, if not specifically point by point
13 alreadyrebuttedin the deposition, clearly is not my
14 client'srecollectionof what occurred.
15
THE COURT: okay. But that's - we are
16 not there yet.
17
MR. DUNN: Understood. I believe that's
18 the entirety of my argument. But I would put that in
19 addition to what the Court has already raised.
20
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to take it
21 under advisement. Leave me a copy of the depo.
22
MR. HENDERSON: Could we send that back
23 over to you, Judge?
24
THE COURT: Sure, that will be fine.
25
(Hearing adjourned.)
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